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Abstract
The growing incidence of product safety complaints pertaining to imported
goods from China has been one of the most widely covered phenomena in
2007. China’s reputation as the factory of the world suffered immensely, a
result of product recalls ranging from poisoned dog food to children’s toys
saturated with lead. The Chinese government, as a result, attempted to re-
pair their image as a producer of safe exports. These efforts culminated in
the nationwide crackdown on the production of substandard goods and
the arrest of 774 people on October 29, 2007 [1]. Pressures in the United
States did not cease, however, with influential politicians, including 2008
presidential hopeful Barack Obama, continuing to call for a ban on all
Chinese-made toys [2].1 Are increased regulation and protectionist mea-
sures necessary to maximize social welfare? We seek to study possible
reasons for these seemingly sudden safety deficiencies, and hope to ascer-
tain an optimal remedy. This study examines whether market power held
by importing firms forces their respective Chinese contracting firms to un-
dertake cost-cutting measures, whether such a market structure exists in
the Chinese toy market, and a brief overview of possible economic justi-
fications for Chinese firms to use hazardous materials in their production
process in order to cut costs.
1It is not our intention to single out Senator Obama; his specific mention reflects the
breadth and importance the ”China issue” has become in the United States, as opposed
to a personal commentary.
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1 Introduction
China’s reputation as an exporter of safe products has been rendered nonex-
istent amid a sea of product recalls and intense media scrutiny. In 2007 the
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission’s China Program Plan stated
that ”on average about two-thirds of all U.S. product recalls are of im-
ported products, and the large majority of those products are manufac-
tured in China,” while the European Union, similarly, reported approxi-
mately 48 percent of its dangerous product recalls in 2007 to be Chinese [3].
57 percent of American consumers, furthermore, stated themselves ”not
too confident” or ”not at all confident” in the safety of products made
in China when polled [3]. The damage to China’s reputation is therefore
well documented. Close analysis of the impetus behind China’s appar-
ent incapability to produce safe goods, however, has not been quite as
robust. It is our hypothesis that market power held by firms that import
Chinese-made toys forces their respective contracting Chinese firms to cut
costs. These cost-cutting measures may entail negative externalities that
are thrust upon an unknowing consumer, such as the use of hazardous
materials epitomized by the infamous lead paint of the Mattel recalls.
In Section 2 we illustrate background information about the structure
of the Chinese toy market, the pressures Chinese firms are under to cut
costs, and how hazardous materials such as lead paint are appealing to
firms in such a situation. Section 3 describes the consequences of the
monopsony market structure and why this leads Chinese firms to cut costs.
Section 4 describes the economic theory that forms the basis of our econo-
metric study as to whether it is possible importing firms in the U.S. hold
market power in the Chinese toy market. Section 5 illustrates the results of
the empirical analysis. Section 6 briefly reviews some possible economic
justifications for Chinese firms to use hazardous materials in their pro-
duction process in order to cut costs. Section 7 shows the framework for
determining a theoretical socially optimal quantity of toys, possible reme-
dies for the market failure, and concludes.
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2 Background
2.1 Outsourcing Structure
Throughout the last decade China has slowly evolved into the factory of
the world, as many large corporations outsource their production in an
effort to cut costs through the cheaper capital and labor alternatives that
China provides. Mattel for example, closed its last U.S. factory in 2002,
and now produces approximately 65 percent of its products in China, or
as a Mattel executive carefully rephrased it, ”more than a third of Mattel
toys are made outside of China” [4].
The outsourcing model that importing firms use, however, provides
little transparency and engenders the information asymmetry that allows
Chinese firms to use hazardous materials such as lead paint in their pro-
duction process. Sometimes Chinese firms are chosen for their ability to
”cope with capricious and corrupt local officials,” as opposed to their ef-
ficiency [5]. Many American firms, furthermore, have long-term relation-
ships with certain Chinese contractors, sometimes spanning decades, that
result in lax inspection by the importing firms [4]. The suppliers in the
Mattel recalls, Lee Der Industrial and The Early Light Industrial Company,
for example, had worked with Mattel for 15 and 20 years respectively [4].
Such relationships lull U.S. firms into a false sense of security and moral
hazard where they stop taking necessary precautions to ensure compli-
ance, such as surprise inspections of contracted Chinese firms, believing
China to be a stable and safe environment for production. As Mr. Stoelting
of RC2 toys admitted, ”We took some things for granted” [6].
While this should not be construed as an indictment of all Chinese pro-
ducing firms, the sheer volume and intense competitive nature of export-
ing markets in China ensures that certain firms will cut costs however they
can if it is possible. This is a result of the lax enforcement of regulations
in China, as well as a number of firms competing for precious contracts
from U.S. firms. Mattel has over 1,000 licensees who can produce goods
based on its brands [7]. These same licensees operate about 3,000 factories
in China [7]. Some estimates go as high as to place the total number of toy
factories in China, many of them small operations, at 10,000 [7].
Many Chinese firms contracted by U.S. firms, furthermore, also con-
tinue to subcontract their production to other Chinese firms, who then
continue to subcontract their production to even more Chinese firms. These
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secondary and tertiary subcontracted firms are often faceless and unknown
to the importing U.S. firms. Such a process makes it difficult for import-
ing U.S. firms to properly monitor the goods they are purchasing even if
they were willing to put forward the effort to do so. Some of Mattel’s
most trusted vendors, as was demonstrated in its toy recalls, have subcon-
tracted to cheaper paint suppliers outside the company’s approved list [4].
Even though Mattel had vetted the contractors involved in its toy recalls,
the process of further subcontracting meant that ”a number of companies
whose factories Mattel had never visited may have had a hand in making
the toys that were shipped around the world” [4]. Even if large companies
are informed and compliant of safety regulations, their respective subcon-
tracters may not be. It is this flaw that has caused Mattel to start enforcing
a rule that ”subcontractors cannot hire two and three layers of suppliers
below them” [4].
The market structure in China is also heavily weighted in favor of im-
porting U.S. firms, a result of the intensely competitive marketplace. K.K.
Choy of Wealthwise Industrial Ltd., a large Mattel contractor, illustrates
the market power Mattel holds, as Mattel is capable of giving ”Wealthwise
a steady diet of work producing all manner of Elmo, Dora and other toys,
...[but] also remains careful to channel some business to smaller firms to
keep them in the game” [6]. Such behavior, where U.S. companies are able
to purposefully preserve the kind of competition that drives down prices,
theoretically should not exist in a perfectly competitive market. Foreign
firms are also known to exploit the Chinese exporting market’s chronic
overcapacity by ”shopping door-to-door for vendors who will do what-
ever it takes to win business” [6]. It is this sort of market structure that
would cause firms to seek to cut costs. As Mattel’s executive vice presi-
dent of worldwide operations Thomas Debrowski conceded, ”Youve seen
labor prices more than double, raw material prices double or triple, and I
think that theres a lot of pressure on guys that are working at the margin
to try to save money” [4]. Many Chinese business executives complain of
the pressures Western companies place on suppliers to lower costs, which,
coupled with poor regulation, often encourages desperate or greedy firms
to cut costs however they can [7]. As Mr. Gu, a factory owner in the Shen-
zhen province, asserts of the infamous price slasher Wal-mart: ”Do you
want to kill yourself? Then do business with Wal-Mart” [6].
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2.2 Use of Hazardous Inputs
Does the market structure in China cause Chinese firms to cut costs, and
would using hazardous materials such as lead paint assist them in that
endeavor? We will define a hazardous input as an input used by a Chinese
firm in its production process that is hazardous to the consumers of its
product. An example would be lead paint.
Rising costs in China have been well documented. Whereas for the
past decade China enjoyed unparalleled minimums in labor and capital
costs, the advent of other Asian nations imitating the China outsourcing
strategy has provided competition. Domestic conditions, moreover, have
contributed to China’s weakening worldwide competitiveness, a result of
more expensive land and labor, China’s willingness to allow the value of
the yuan float, as well as a stagnant domestic market [8]. The manager of
a plastic bag factory in the province of Dongguan, for example, cited a 30
percent rise in wages over the past three years, while inputs such as ABS
plastic, a basic raw material in model cars, has more than doubled, while
nickel, the key ingredient in batteries, has increased from around 16,000
U.S. dollars a ton to almost 47,000 dollars a ton [6]. These rising prices are
also a result of China’s exponential economic growth over the past decade,
as more and more manufacturers enter the market.
Use of hazardous inputs such as lead paint can help Chinese firms cut
their costs. A sales manager at Big Tree Toys, a company in the Shantou
province, admitted that ”leaded paint was about 30 percent cheaper than
paint without lead,” while other estimates even put the price of paint with
higher levels of lead at a third of the cost of paint with low levels [7]. Lead
paint is bright, durable, flexible, fast-drying, anti-corrosive, and cheap [9].
Lead chromates can enhance a yellow or orange hue, paint manufacturers
add lead to make paint stick better instead of flaking off, and lead paint
even resists mildew [9]. China also produces enormous quantities of lead
paint, since coloring agents like lead chromate are cheaper than organic
pigments, which means the price of lead paint in China is generally far
lower than paint with low levels of lead [9]. As the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency in the United States warns, however, lead paint is also known
to cause behavioral problems and learning disabilities in children, and in
worst cases, seizures and death [10].
Enforcement of safety regulations is generally not as strict in China rel-
ative to the United States. One observer compared the situation to the
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Soviet Union during the cold war, which had ”very high standards on the
books, but never enforced them” [7]. A study of the lead content of paint
used in production by Chinese firms found that in some 26 percent of the
cases the paint did not meet either American or Chinese standards [7]. As
a Mr. Tao of the Chenghai Guangxin Plastic Toys Factory in the Shantou
Province confided, ”Factories can pick whatever paint they want...there
are simply too many small obscure factories to patrol...no one really en-
forces [safety regulations]” [7]. Given the extreme pressures of doing busi-
ness with U.S. firms, lax enforcement standards in China, as well as the
numerous and wonderful attributes of lead paint2, it is of great curiousity
why the product recalls of 2007 have not been a more common occurence.
3 Monopsony Consequences
In this section we review the economic theory that supplies the stimulus
for our assertion that an oligopsony market forces toy-producing firms in
China to cut costs.
3.1 The Monopsony Market Structure
An oligopsonymarket is a market consisting of a small number of firms that
can purchase from many sellers. We are curious as to whether this defini-
tion applies to the Chinese toy market. A monopsony market is a market
consisting of a single buyer that can purchase from many sellers. As a
means of simplifying our analysis of the Chinese toy market, we will use
this monopsony construct as the crux for our economic theory. A quick
recap of the monopsony market structure: let us assume that the toy mar-
ket in the U.S. is perfectly competitive, and therefore our monopsony firm
takes the market price as given. Let us also assume that this firm’s pro-
duction function for the quantities of this output depends on a specialized
input, the market for which we believe the firm holds market power in, as
well as a vector of other non-specialized inputs, or f(xt, ~x).
Let us now look at Figure A (page 7). The indices given are the price
of toys imported from China, wt, and the quantity of toys imported from
China, qt, on the y and x axes respectively. Our monopsony firm’s total
2The author is in no way condoning the ingestion, use, or abuse of lead paint.
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revenue is the price it receives in its perfectly competitive output market,
multiplied by the firm’s total output, or p ·f(xt, ~x). The additional revenue
that this firm receives when it employs an additional unit of its specialized
input, in our case the toys it imports from China as a result of outsourcing,
is therefore p · δf(xt,~x)
δxt
, or the marginal revenue product of toy imports,
MRPt. This is the change in quantity produced by the monopsony firm
over the change in toy imports supplied ceteris paribus, multiplied by the
price, which is what we obtain if we take the partial derivative of the firm’s
total revenue with respect to the quantity of toy imports. This can also be
seen as the demand for toys.
Figure A: Profit Maximization by a Monopsonist
Assuming our firm holds market power in the specialized input mar-
ket, the supply of toys is described by the upward sloping toy supply
curve wt(xt). This curve tells us the price that is necessary to induce a
given quantity of the specialized input to be offered in the market, and is
the marginal cost of toys to a typical Chinese firm. The implication of an
upward sloping supply curve is also that the monopsony firm must pay a
higher price when it wants to purchase more specialized inputs.
A firm’s total costs are therefore the price of the specialized input mul-
tiplied by the quantity bought of the input, plus a price vector of all non-
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specialized inputs multiplied by a quantity vector of all other non-specialized
inputs. This can also be written as
TC = wtxt + ~w~x. (1)
The marginal expenditure on toys MEt equals the marginal cost of toys
to the monopsony firm, which is the change in the monopsony firms total
cost over the change in toy imports supplied ceteris paribus. This is equal
to the price paid for the specialized input, plus the change in the price of
the specialized input over the change in the quantity of the input supplied
multiplied by the quantity of the input supplied. The marginal expendi-
ture on toy imports can therefore be thought of as the partial derivative of
the monopsony firm’s total cost function (1) with respect to the quantity
of toys imported.
δTC
δxt
=
wtδxt + xtδwt
δxt
= wt +
xtδwt
δxt
.
(2)
We also see in Figure A (page 7) that whereas in a competitive market
the supply equals the demand and a total of qc toys is produced at a price
pc, in a monopsony environment the monopsony firm will purchase toys at
pm and qm. It is important to note that although the monopsony firm now
consumes qm quantity of toys, it pays a price pm as dictated by the supply
of toyswt(xt), not the marginal expenditure on toys. The monopsony price
and quantity are given when marginal revenue product equals marginal
expenditures, which is the profit-maximizing condition we obtain if we
take our profit equation and find the partial derivative with respect to the
quantity of toys imported. Our profit-maximizing equation is obtained by
subtracting total costs from total revenue and setting it equal to zero.
Π = p · f(xt, ~x)− wtxt − ~w~x = 0 (3)
Taking partial derivatives with respect to the quantity vector of non-
specialized inputs and the quantity of toys allows us to obtain our first
order conditions of
p · δf(. . .)
δ~x
= ~w (4)
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and
p · δf(. . .)
δxt
=
wtδxt + xtδwt
δxt
= wt +
xtδwt
δxt
(5)
respectively. We obtain a perfectly competitive result for non-specialized
inputs, as we assume the firm is a price taker in other markets, and there-
fore inputs are employed until the value of the marginal product of the
input equals the market price. For our specialized input, however, we
see that inputs are employed until the value of the marginal product of
the input equals the marginal expenditure of the input, or MRPt = MEt.
The profit-maximizing condition for a monopsonist in the toy market can
therefore also be thought of as the partial derivative of the monopsony
firm’s profit function with respect to the quantity of toys imported.
3.2 Cutting Costs
We theorize that the recent rash of unsafe products is a result of the pres-
sures on Chinese firms to cut costs. Such pressures are due to the mar-
ket power large U.S. firms hold in the Chinese toy market, creating an
intensely competitive atmosphere for Chinese firms. If the Chinese toy
market is indeed an oligopsony market, U.S. firms may be able to dictate
the prices they pay for toys to some extent. A visual inspection of Fig-
ure B (page 10) shows that input-producing toy firms must cut costs in a
monopsony environment.
On the left side we have the monopsony model we are familiar with.
On the right side, however, we see the cost curves for a typical Chinese
firm, and its indices remain the price and quantity of toys. In a competitve
market it produces a quantity of q1 at a price of pc, where q1 ·n = qc, n being
the number of total firms in the Chinese toy market. Given the decrease in
price as per a monopsony market structure, Chinese toy-producing firms
must lower their short run average total costs if they are to produce at the
monopsony price and quantity pm and q2 respectively. The question that
remains is therefore whether this necessity to cut costs translates into the
use of hazardous inputs in the Chinese firm’s production process, such
as the use of lead paint. Standard microeconomic theory would postulate
that a given Chinese firm would decrease its plant size and change its
9
Figure B: Cutting Costs
proportion of inputs accordingly. We will review possible justifications
for using hazardous inputs in section 6.
4 Empirical Theory
In this section we delineate the empirical theory that forms the basis of our
econometric analysis as to whether it is possible that importing firms hold
market power in the Chinese toy market.
4.1 Literature Review
The basis of our econometric study is the profit-maximizing condition
for a monopsonist. There have been numerous studies that empirically
test for monopsony/monopoly or oligopsony/oligopoly power. Most are
based on a technique developed by Appelbaum (1982) which tested for
monopoly power assuming fixed proportions technology [11]. Most em-
pirical studies also pertain to agricultural industries. Azzam and Pagoulatos
(1990), as well as Muth and Wohlgenant (1999), all tested for oligopsony
power in the beef packing industry [12] [13]. Quagrainie, Unterschultz,
Veeman, and Jeffrey (2003) test market power in the Canadian cattle and
hogs market, while Crespi, Gao, and Peterson (2005) teset for oligopsony
behavior in the rice milling industry [14] [15]. Finally, both Murray (1995)
and Bergman (1995) measure oligopsony behavior in the U.S. and Swedish
pulp and paper industry, respectively [16] [17]. The common denomina-
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tor in all these studies is the use of the basic monopsony model to build an
econometric modeling technique.
4.2 Inverse Elasticity Pricing Rule
We recall that the profit-maximizing condition for a monopsonist is ob-
tained by setting the profit equation for our monopsony firm to zero, as
seen in equation (3), and that this gives us the first order conditions shown
in equations (4) and (5) respectively. Doing this provides two benefits.
First, we have now obtained a general form of the first order condition
that allows for imperfect competition,
wt + θxt
wt
δxt
= p · f(· · · )
δxt
, (6)
as seen in Muth [13], where θ is a parameter that indexes the degree of
market power. If the market is perfectly competitive, θ equals zero, and
the first order condition reduces to equation (4). If the market is monop-
sonistic, then θ equals one, and the marginal expenditure of toy imports
equals the marginal revenue product of toy imports.
By rearranging the first order condition for our specialized input, fur-
thermore, we can obtain
p · δf(. . .)
δxt
= wt
(
1 +
δwt
δxt
(
xt
wt
))
= wt
(
1 +
1
E
)
,
(7)
as seen in Murray [16], where E equals δxt
δt
(wt
xt
). This is the percentage
change in the quantity of the specialized input supplied per a percent
change in the price of the specialized input, which is to say E equals the
price elasticity of our specialized input supply, or imported toy supply.
Manipulating the equation further will give us
MRPt − wt
wt
=
1
xt,wt
. (8)
This is what Besanko and Braeutigam term the inverse elasticity pricing
rule [18]. This will form the basis of our econometric study, as this condi-
tion tells us that the percentage deviation between the marginal revenue
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product of toy imports and the price of toy imports is equal to the inverse
of the elasticity of the imported toy supply. While in a perfectly competi-
tive market each firm takes the price of inputs as given, thus maximizing
their profits by choosing a quantity of the input that equates the price of
the input to the marginal revenue product of that input, in our monopsony
market a firm will pay a price less than the marginal revenue product.
4.3 Further Literature Review
All the studies previously mentioned follow the economic process in 4.2
to some degree, with a few caveats concerning notation and terminol-
ogy. Due to differing data limitations, however, each study approaches the
specification of their econometric model somewhat differently. Bergman
attempts to estimate the supply elasticity simultaneously with the rest of
his model as opposed to comparing his results with prior information on
the supply and demand elasticities of the pulp and paper industry [17].
Azzam and Pagoulatos use a production-function approach which ”al-
lows all inputs to be used in variable proportions and allows the deriva-
tion of market specific conjectural elasticities” [12]. Quagrainie, Unter-
schultz, Veeman, and Jeffrey assume a translog profit function and apply
Hotelling’s lemma to obtain supply equations [14]. Murray estimates a
variable profit function system in order to infer a factor’s value of marginal
product through its shadow price [16]. Crespi, Gao, and Peterson as-
sume Hicks-neutral production in order to avoid ”specifying explicit func-
tional forms for the input supply equations” and conserve degrees of free-
dom [15]. Finally, Muth and Wohlgenant use an application of the enve-
lope theorem to derive a perceived demand function and an input supply
equation in a model that only requires two structural equations [13]. We
hope to emulate portions of this last model.
4.4 Deriving the Regression
Let us return to our profit-maximizing equation (3). We can rewrite our
equation, apply the envelope theorem similar to Muth and Wohlgenant,
such that the optimal quantities of non-specialized inputs are conditional
on the level of our specialized input, the imports of toys [13]. Assum-
ing that there are only two non-specialized inputs, labor and capital, we
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rewrite our profit-maximizing equation (3) as
Π = p · f(xt, x∗L, x∗K)− wtxt − wLx∗L − wKx∗K , (9)
such that labor and capital are optimal quantities conditional on the level
of our specialized input. This is to say that labor and capital are a function
of the quantity of our specialized input, the price of labor, the price of
capital, and the price of our monopsony firm’s output, or xL(xt, wL, wK , p)
and xK(xt, wL, wK , p) respectively. If we now take the partial of our profit-
maximizing equation (9) with respect to the quantity of our specialized
input, applying the chain rule, we obtain
δΠ
δxt
= p
δf(xt, x
∗
L, x
∗
K)
δxt
+ p
δf(· · · )
δx∗L
δx∗L
δxt
+ p
δf(· · · )
δx∗K
δx∗K
δxt
− xt δwt
δxt
− wt − wL δx
∗
L
δxt
− wK δx
∗
K
δxt
= 0,
(10)
which also equals
wt + xt
δwt
δxt
= p
δf(xt, x
∗
L, x
∗
K)
δxt
+
(
p
δf(· · · )
δx∗L
− wL
)
δx∗L
δxt
+
(
p
δf(· · · )
δx∗K
)
δx∗K
δxt
.
(11)
Let us now assume that our monopsony firm does not hold market power
in its non-specialized input markets, and that labor and capital are func-
tion of the quantity of our specialized input, the price of labor, the price of
capital, and the price of our monopsony firm’s output, or xL(xt, wL, wK , p)
and xK(xt, wL, wK , p) respectively. We can therefore reduce equation (11)
to
wt = −xt δwt
δxt
+ p
δf(xt, xL(xt, wL, wK , p), xK(xt, wL, wK , p))
δxt
. (12)
The envelope theorem allows us to differentiate our profit function with
respect to the quantity of our specialized input holding our non-specialized
inputs at their optimally efficient levels, given that the monopsony firm is
a price taker in those non-specialized input markets. Since the optimal
quantities of labor and capital do not depend on our specialized input,
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the last two terms drop out, leaving us with equation (12). Then follow-
ing Muth [13] we are able to identify the degree of market power with
a reduced-form value marginal product specification, which allows us to
insert a linear reduced-form value marginal product to obtain
wt = −xt δwt
δxt
+ β1xt + β2xL + β3xK + β4p. (13)
5 Empirical Analysis
In the following section we review our econometric process and the find-
ings that we obtained.
5.1 Preparation
The specific firm we study is Mattel, due to its prominent role in the events
that transpired. From Mattel’s quarterly SEC filings we obtain labor ex-
penditures, classified as the aggregate of advertising, promotion, selling,
and administrative expenses; capital expenditures, classified as quarterly
purchases of property, plant and equipment; Mattel’s quarterly expendi-
tures on inputs to manufacture its toys; and Mattel’s inventory stock at the
beginning of each quarter. From the Bureau of Labor statistics we obtain
a BEA end use import price index, harmonized price index, harmonized
system import price indices with and without tariffs, as well as the pro-
ducer price index for domestic toy prices.
Since the theoretical relationship between some of our variables might
have a constant elasticity, but not a constant slope, we will use a semi-log
model. A one unit increase in the BEA, harmonized with tariffs, harmo-
nized without tariffs, or producer price indices, is equal to a one percent
increase in prices, leading us not to transform those indices with the natu-
ral logarithm. After transforming the rest, our equation looks like
BEAindex = c+ β1log(revenues) + β2log(labor)
+ β3log(capital) + β4(producerpriceindex),
(14)
where the producer price index is used as a proxy variable for domestic
toy prices, the price Mattel receives for its output, log(revenues) is used as
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a proxy variable for the supply of imported toys, and the BEA index is
used as the proxy variable for the price of imported toys from China. We
also take the natural logarithm of labor and capital. We postulate that the
output of our specialized input is endogenously determined and therefore
correlated with the residuals. We therefore use a two stage least squares
model with the harmonized system import index with and without tar-
iffs, domestic toy prices, the natural logarithm of Mattel inventories at the
beginning of each quarter, the natural logarithm of Mattel’s expenditures
on inputs to manufacture toys, the natural logarithm of capital, the natu-
ral logarithm of labor and the natural logarithm of a trend variable as our
instrument list. This way we might eliminate possible simultaneity. The
supply of our specialized input is dependent upon domestic toy prices,
Mattel’s existing inventories, and the inputs Mattel uses to manufacture
toys, as well as capital, labor, and the prices of imported toys. We need
such a model since more than one dependent variable, specifically the
price and quantity of imported toys, is being determined at the same time.
If we do not use more than one equation our ordinary least squares esti-
mates will be biased. Since quarterly data is skewed toward the holiday
season, where Mattel’s expenditures and revenues are both consistently
higher, we also weigh our regression over log(revenues) in an attempt to
minimize heteroskedasticity.
5.2 Results
All our econometric analysis used the statistical program EViews. Our
original results are given in the appendix as Table I. We conclude that
log(revenues), log(capital), and domtoyprices are all statistically significant
at a 5 percent significance level, which is consistent with our critical t-value
for a one-sided 5 percent level of significance, 1.708, as well as the p-values
in our original results. Log(labor), however, is not statistically significant,
requiring at least a 12.76 percent significance level. Testing our f-statistic
also confirms that at a 5 percent significance level at least one of our slope
coefficients is statistically different from zero, given a critical value of 2.76.
Testing for multicollinearity by examining the correlation coefficients,
given in Table II, shows that log(capital) and log(labor) might be a source
of multicollinearity. In an attempt to remedy the problem, we regress
log(labor) on all the remaining independent variables, seen in Table III,
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as well as regressing log(capital) on all the remaining independent vari-
ables, seen in Table IV. Measuring the variance inflation factor confirms
that log(labor) is a possible source of multicollinearity given its variance
inflation factor of 5.88, greater than the benchmark of 4, while log(capital)
only has a variance inflation factor of 2.85. Since eliminating log(labor) ren-
ders our model statistically useless, however, we will avoid multicollinear-
ity paranoia and retain log(labor) in our econometric model for the time
being.
A test of the Durbin-Watson statistic is inconclusive, although just barely.
Our Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.28 lies between our critical values of 1.14
and 1.74, and a visual inspection of the residuals given in Table V shows
the same. Autocorrelation, therefore, possibly exists in our model, al-
though the possibility does not seem overwhelmingly threatening.
We also test for heteroskedasticity using a White test, seen in Table VI.
We find that heteroskedasticity is present since our observed r-squared
is less than our critical chi-squared of 23.68. We therefore apply White’s
method in an attempt to obtain more accurate standard errors, and thus
t-values.
This allows us to attain our final model, whose results are given in Ta-
ble VII. We now see that log(labor) is statistically significant at a 10 percent
significance level, reflected in its t-statistic. We also construct confidence
intervals for each slope coefficient, as seen in Figure C (page 16). Possible
Figure C: Slope Coefficients
problems with autocorrelation and multicollinearity within our model is
most likely a result of the proxy variables that we chose due to lack of
available data. The BEA price index, specifically, measures the price of all
toy imports into the U.S., and not just China. Our r-squared of 0.76 tells
us that although a good majority is explained by our existing independent
variables, we are probably still missing some explanatory variables in our
model.
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The coefficient we are interested in is that of log(revenues) This should
tell us that for every percent increase in revenues, there is a 7.53 percent
decrease in our BEA import price index, which should resemble a 7.53 per-
cent decrease in prices. If we look back at equation (8), this is identical to
the inverse of our elasticity of toy imports supply. We therefore conclude
that Mattel holds some form of market power in its specialized input, toy
imports, since there is a 7.53 percent deviation between the marginal rev-
enue product of toy imports and the price of toy imports.
6 Implications
Even if importing firms hold some form of market power in the Chinese
toy market, does this necessarily force their respective contracting Chinese
firms to use hazardous inputs such as lead paint? In this section we scratch
the surface of some possible economic justifications as examples for future
study.
6.1 Survival
It is our theory that although they may find the risks associated with using
hazardous materials too great in a competitive environment, some firms
may find such risks worth taking if they are faced with the decision of
survival, when the price pm of toys is below the minimum level of average
variable cost, assuming all fixed costs are sunk. The intense competitive
nature of the Chinese toy market forces firms to cut costs. This scenario is
illustrated in Figure D (page 18). 3 We see that at the given monopsony
price of pm the typical Chinese firm takes a loss in the short run equal to the
shaded area, which can also be expressed as
∫ qm
0
(SAC1(q2)−SMC(q2))dxt.
The firm will continue to operate with a negative economic profit in
the short run since it can still offset some of its loss when the firm’s total
revenue still exceeds its total variable cost. The firm will therefore not shut
down until the monopsony price is lower than its shutdown price of ps. If
the firm believes this monopsony price will persist, however, it cannot
stay in the market indefinitely, and will most likely reduce its plant size or
3The author expresses great appreciation to Henry Pan for his assistance with the
graphical portion of this depiction.
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Figure D: Survival
possibly exit the market entirely. If possible, the firm would ideally like to
lower its costs to SAC2 such that it no longer operates at a loss.
6.2 Long Run Analysis
Let us recall that the profit-maximizing condition for a monopsonist dic-
tates a monopsony price that would force a typical individual Chinese
firm to lower its short run average total cost curve, as shown in Figure B.
Let us also recall that a typical Chinese firm’s shutdown price is defined
by its average variable cost curve, as shown in Figure D (page 18). If the
firm believes that a monopsony price lower than the shutdown price will
persist, it will most likely reduce its plant size or possibly exit the mar-
ket entirely. Figure E (page 19) illustrates a typical Chinese firm’s long
run average cost curve and long run marginal cost curve, where the long
run average cost curve is the lower envelope of the short run average cost
curves [18]. Firms may adjust their plant sizes and can even leave the
industry altogether, which is also to say that a long run perfectly compet-
itive equilibrium does not currently exist. Given a monopsony price pm,
furthermore, the firm must eventually leave the market since the price pm
is below the minimum of the long run average cost curve. With a long run
marginal and average cost curve depicted in Figure E, the firm would earn
negative profit regardless of any adjustments to the proportions of inputs
it employs. If the firm is able to lower its long run marginal and average
cost curves as in Figure F (page 20), however, then it will be able to shift its
short run average cost curve to an equilibrium such that it is able to stay
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Figure E: Long Run Shutdown
in the industry, where the minimum of its average cost curve is equal to
the given monopsony price.
It is important to note that the shift in these cost curves is consistent not
with a change in the proportion of inputs as we would expect in the short
run, but rather illustrates that the Chinese firm has managed to reduce
its long run costs, possibly through technological advancement, or as we
hypothesize, through the use of hazardous inputs.
6.3 Over-production Externality
We also note that the long run marginal cost curves given in Figures E and
F represent the long run supply curves of the Chinese toy market, start-
ing from the intersect of the long run marginal cost and long run average
cost curves. If we analyze the shift of these supply curves we can observe
the negative externality associated with over-production in Figure G (page
20).
Since the Chinese firm does not need to internalize the negative effects
of using hazardous materials in its toys, its private marginal cost is equal
to the shifted long run marginal cost curve, while the firm should have
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Figure F: Long Run Shift
Figure G: Over-production Externality
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exited the market and the long run supply curve should be LS1, which is
equal to the social marginal cost. The social welfare loss is described as∫ qm
qo
(LS1 −D)dxt.
6.4 Information Asymmetry
The other facet to the market failure in the toy industry pertains to asym-
metric information, which causes a greater-than-optimal demand from
consumers. If an importing firm such as Mattel was aware that toys it
bought from Chinese firms might have product safety deficiencies, then
it might presumably demand less since the marginal benefit it would re-
ceive from the toys would be less due to damages to its reputation when
Mattel’s consumers buy toys that are hazardous to their health. This ar-
gument holds true for the ordinary consumer as well. Figure H (page 21)
Figure H: Information Asymmetry
illustrates the fact that if consumers cannot accurately ascertain the actual
marginal benefit of imported toys, they will demand a quantity of qi at a
price of pi instead of the socially optimal quantity and price of qo and po
respectively. The deadweight loss due to this market failure can be char-
acterized as
∫ qi
qo
(MC −MCactual)dxt. It is also this information asymmetry
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that would allow Chinese firms to cut costs by using hazardous inputs, as
if consumers had perfect information, they would demand a smaller quan-
tity of toys and the equilibrium quantity of toys produced would also be
smaller.
6.5 Game Theoretics
Would a Chinese firm be more inclined to risk using hazardous inputs in
a monopsony environment as opposed to a perfectly competitive market?
In an intensely competitive market such as China, competitive pressures
alone may drive firms to ”cheat” and use hazardous inputs. We examine
a simplistic exercise with two firms.
In Figure J (page 22) we illustrate the decisions facing two firms regard-
ing their expected costs in a perfectly competitive market. We delineate p
the probability a firm believes it will be caught using hazardous inputs,
and therefore (1-p) is the probability the firm will escape detection. For
simplicity’s sake we assume the probability is the same for both firms. S
is given as a given firm’s sunk costs, also assumed to be the same for sim-
plicity. In a perfectly competitive environment the use of hazardous inputs
by one firm increases competitive pressures on other firms, and serves to
push the equilibrium price down. We will ignore the prospect of economic
rent.
Firm 2 Uses Firm 2 Does Not Use
Hazardous Inputs Hazardous Inputs
Firm 1 Uses (-S)p, (-S)p (-S)p, p(S) - S
Hazardous Inputs
Firm 1 Does Not p(S) - S, (-S)p ⇒ 0, 0⇐
Use Hazardous Inputs
Figure J: Competitive Decisions
Therefore if both firms use hazardous inputs the expected costs to ei-
ther firm can be described as EC = (−S)p + (0)(1 − p) = (−S)p, or the
probability that they are discovered, multiplied by their sunk costs, which
they would forfeit from losing their contract or being shut down, plus the
probability that they will escape detection, multiplied by their expected
economic profit, which is zero. Their expected economic profit is zero
since the pressures in a competitive market pushes the equilibrium price
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lower and other firms are faced with the decision of matching these de-
creases or leaving the market. This is also to say the use of hazardous
inputs by the firms increases competitive pressures and helps lower the
equilibrium price.
If firm one uses hazardous inputs and firm two does not, then the
expected cost of firm one remains the same. They would forfeit their
sunk costs if discovered, and make zero economic profit if they evade
detection. The expected costs of firm two, however, will depend on the
probability that firm one is discovered, and can be described as EC =
(0)p + (−S)(1− p) = p(S)− S. If firm one is discovered firm two will not
face increased competitive pressure and continue to produce and make an
economic profit of zero. If firm two is not discovered, firm one will be
driven from the market since they cannot keep pace with increased com-
petitive pressure and lower equilibrium price. The reverse holds true if
firm two uses hazardous inputs and firm one does not. If neither firm
uses hazardous inputs then they both expect to make an economic profit
of zero since neither will face increased competitive pressures or risks of
using hazardous inputs.
Let us look at firm one (Figure J, page 22). If firm two uses hazardous
inputs, firm one will face expected costs of either (-S)p or (S)p - S. We recall
that for simplicity we assume the probability of detection facing either
firm is the same, and is p. Firm one’s expected costs therefore depend on
the probability of detection; for any value of p over 0.5 firm one should
not use hazardous inputs, for any value of p over 0.5 firm one should use
hazardous inputs, and if p equals 0.5 firm one is indifferent. The same
holds true if we look at the situation from the perspective of firm two.
If firm two does not use hazardous inputs, then firm two will also never
use hazardous inputs because the best outcome for firm two if it does use
hazardous inputs can only be zero, if the probability of detection is zero.
What is of importance is that the best outcome for either firm regardless
is zero. If both firms use hazardous inputs and there is no probability of
detection they will make zero economic profit. If firm one uses hazardous
inputs and firm two does not, and the use of hazardous inputs will always
be detected, firm one will take a loss of -S and firm two will make zero
economic profit. If the use of hazardous inputs is never detected, firm
one will make zero economic profit and firm two will take a loss of -S. A
dominant strategy is a strategy that is better regardless of the other player’s
decision. The dominant strategy for both firms in a perfectly competitive
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market is therefore to never use hazardous inputs, and is delineated by
arrows in Figure J (page 22).
Firm 2 Uses Firm 2 Does Not Use
Hazardous Inputs Hazardous Inputs
Firm 1 Uses ⇒ (−S)p, (−S)p⇐ (-S)p, -S
Hazardous Inputs
Firm 1 Does Not -S, (-S)p -S, -S
Use Hazardous Inputs
Figure K: Monopsony Decisions
Figure K (page 24) shows a similar situation but in a monopsony envi-
ronment. The difference here is that if firm one uses hazardous inputs and
firm two does not, then firm two has an expected cost of EC = p(−S) +
(1 − p)(−S) = p(−S) − S + p(S) = −S. This is because regardless of
whether or not firm one is discovered, firm two will always be driven out
of the market if it does not use hazardous inputs since the monopsony
market structure dictates a lower price. The dominant strategy for either
firm in a monopsony market, therefore, is to always use hazardous inputs
since even if a firm faces a probability equal to one, where they are always
caught, this is still only equal to the costs they face regardless if they do
not use hazardous inputs, or -S. This is shown in Figure K (page 24) with
arrows.
7 Conclusion
We hope to illustrate some possible remedies for the oligopsony market
failure and summarize our findings.
7.1 Optimal Market Outcome
Figure L (page 25) illustrates an optimal outcome taking into account the
costs of preventure. The indices are given as the price of prevention wp
and the quantity of prevention xp, on the y and x axes respectively. The
total cost of accidents due to unsafe toys is TCa, or p(x)(A), where p(x)
is the probability of incurring an accident as a function of the quantity of
prevention, x, multiplied by the cost of the accident, A. The total cost of
prevention is given as TCp, or wp(x), where wp is the price of prevention as
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Figure L: Optimal Market Outcome
a function of the quantity of prevention x. This prevention might take the
form of mandatory safety inspections implemented by the government,
an importing firm’s own efforts in paying closer attention to its contracting
firms, or a Chinese firm’s use of non-hazardous materials. We will address
the question of which party might be able to offer prevention at the lowest
cost in the following section. For now, we seek to find the optimal quantity
of prevention, which we derive from our expected social cost function
ESC = p(x)(A) + wp(x). (15)
Our cost-minimizing condition is where the slope of our expected cost
function equals zero, which can also be expresed as
dESC
dx
=
dp(x)
dx
(A) +
dwp
dx
= 0
⇒ dp(x)
dx
(A) =
−dwp
dx
.
(16)
This quantity is given to us in Figure L (page 25) as x∗.
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7.2 Possible Remedies
The market failure in the Chinese toy market stems from the structure
of the market that gives importing firms such as Mattel power to dictate
prices to its contracting Chinese firms. Given China’s evolving economic
liberalization, however, market constraints may not be the best course of
action. There are no simple ways of reducing the market power importing
U.S. firms have, and imposing price floors would hinder China’s transition
to a free market economy. Nor would market constraints in China neces-
sarily internalize the issue of unsafe toys; there are many countries willing
to cut costs and become the next ”China.” A better strategy would be to
address the allegations that increased regulation or protectionist measures
are necessary. Let us therefore discuss second-best alternatives.
Let us assume Mattel is held strictly liable for any and all damages.
Given this standard, Mattel will choose the socially optimal quantity of
prevention x∗ as given in Figure L (page 25). This is because the expected
social costs of unsafe toys now equal Mattel’s expected private costs. This
standard, however, is only efficient if there are no transactions costs, such
as those associated with court fees, enforcement costs, and under the as-
sumption that each individual that brings suit against Mattel receives per-
fect compensation such that they are indifferent to whether they are party
to the accident ex post.
If Mattel suffers from information asymmetries, furthermore, a strict li-
ability standard may not provide the correct amount of prevention if Mat-
tel is incapable of ascertaining the exact amount of precaution taken by
its contracting Chinese firms. The costs to Mattel would also generally
be higher given this information asymmetry. We therefore posit that Chi-
nese firms are in the best position to prevent accidents at the lowest cost,
since they are fully aware of the costs and inputs they employ. One ideal
course of action would be to hold Chinese firms strictly liable; this is not a
practical solution, however, due to basic issues of sovereignty and politics.
Ex ante regulation could therefore provide a means, at a lower cost, for
internalizing the production of unsafe toys. If bilaterial precaution is not
possible, due to lack of information on the part of consumers, and Chinese
firms cannot be held liable, then the government could mandate safety in-
spections of imported toys. If a standard of care could be set at the socially
optimal level of x∗, it would be the same as if we could hold Chinese firms
strictly liable. It does not seem like a stretch to propose that the level of
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precaution taken by the U.S. government currently might be lower than
the social optimum. The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, for
example, currently only employs one full-time toy inspector, and fifteen
port inspectors to monitor all imports arriving in America [19].
7.3 Conclusion
The reason we propose that the government regulate as opposed to the toy
manufacturers is that the monopsony market failure extends beyond toys.
It is this author’s opinion that reputation will force large firms such as
Mattel to take greater precautions and inspect their contracting factories
more carefully. If the market structure persists, however, Chinese firms
will still be under pressure to cut costs; they will merely have to find other
ways to do so. The sweatshop and child labor scandals prior to the turn
of the century can be seen as just another manner in which Chinese firms
cut costs. The only difference recently is that the negative externality was
borne upon American consumers as opposed to Chinese children. Robin
Munro of the China Labour Bulletin in Hong Kong maintains that labor
conditions in China still remain lacking in comparison to U.S. standards,
while ”long hours of overtime are still expected and worker safety remains
a distant concept” [6]. The issue in China, and what might eventually cor-
rect their market power discrepancy, is their evolution to a free-market
economy and their transformation from manufacturing products that re-
quire cheap labor and poor regulations to producing goods that are tech-
nically advanced and of good quality [6].
In this study we delineated the correlation between a monopsony struc-
ture and pressures on production firms residing in that market to cut costs.
We also provided econometric evidence that large importing firms might
hold market power in China, and suggestions for future study as to whether
pressures to cut costs translate to production of goods that are of lower
quality. These findings are hardly conclusive or encompassing; rather,
they should be seen as evidence for one possible explanation of the toy
safety phenomema in 2007, as well as encouragement for future studies
of market power in developing nations and what externalities they might
engender.
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